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Summary
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development and support for Al Qaeda terrorism, were the
primary justifications put forward for military action.  On March 17, 2003, President
Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from
Iraq within 48 hours.  On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes
against Iraqi leadership positions.  By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition
forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military
leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to
major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB) weapons,
and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found.
The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi
resistance movement and training sufficient Iraqi forces to assume responsibility for
the nations domestic security.  Though initially denying that there was an organized
resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is regional/local
organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding.  CENTCOM
commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical
guerrilla-type campaign.”  DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former
regime supporters and foreign fighters; however, others are concerned that growing
resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of
connections with the earlier regime, are  contributing to the resistance.  According
to DOD, as of January 16, 2006, 2,242  U.S. troops have died in Iraq operations,
1,761 owing to hostile fire. Of these hostile fire deaths, 1,397 have occurred since
May 1, 2003. 16,420 U.S. personnel have been wounded or injured since military
operations began.  Non-U.S. Coalition fatalities have totaled 201, while Iraqi security
force fatalities are estimated to be 3,977.
  There are currently about 153,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, and an additional 20,000
military support personnel in the region.  This may be reduced by 7,000-8,000 troops
in early 2006.  About 21,000 non-U.S. troops are also in theater, with Britain Italy,
and South Korea being the largest contributors.  Other nations contributing troops
include Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador,  Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia),  Japan, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Portugal, Romania, Singapore,
and Slovakia. Some nations, including the Netherlands, Poland, and have indicated
they will further reduce or withdraw their forces during.2006.
Through primarily supplemental appropriations, Congress has provided
approximately $251 billion for Iraq military operations through FY2005, and has
approved an additional emergency FY2006 “bridge fund” appropriation of $50
billion for Iraq and Afghanistan operations, pending an FY2006 supplemental
appropriation request.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Iraq:  U.S. Military Operations
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and Iraqi support for the Al Qaeda terrorist group
were the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military
action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there
was little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
arsenal; however, Administration officials were convinced that Iraq had reconstituted
significant capabilities.  Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-
President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz,
stressed “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.  Later in
2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective.  Expanding on
this theme President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12,
2002, specified  the following conditions for Iraq to  meet to forestall military action
against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or
destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all
related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow
United Nations administration of its funds.1
On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that
Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours.  On March 19,
offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions.
Military Planning & Initial Combat Operations
As military operations continue in Iraq, there has been considerable discussion
about whether the initial planning for the war was adequate and based upon accurate
assumptions.  Prior to the onset of offensive operations, the Department of Defense
released only limited official information concerning war planning or preparations
against Iraq.  There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which
provided a range of details.  News reports indicated that the military options that
were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq
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military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional
governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required.
Options Considered
In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban,
some  Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special
operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled
with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard
units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities.  This approach assumed
that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition
forces once it was clear that defeat was imminent. To encourage this, significant
emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops”
campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading
them of the hopelessness of resistance.2
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally
considered the riskiest approach.  The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas placed their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack was problematic.
This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican
Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.
This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by
U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan,” after Army Gen.
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first
briefed it to the President, called for a large-scale ground force invasion.   News
reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors.  Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3  However, the
White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq
issue to the United Nations Security Council.  When it became clear that Security
Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay
the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that
this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy
somewhat more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations
appeared to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations.  As the ground
force offensive slowed, however, there was increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian
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leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to
onset of operations.4
Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003
Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground
offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften
Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller
ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that
Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years
earlier, and that U.S. forces were significantly more capable.  This option depended
upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging
areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces. 
Though press reports differed somewhat, reportedly over 340,000 U.S. military
personnel were in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat).  The 3rd Mechanized
Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 7th Cavalry
Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground
offensive.  The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater. Ships bearing
its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations
to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted
to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through.  The U.S. Navy deployed
five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups.  The Air Force had
approximately 15 air wings operating in the region.  Strategic bombers operated from
the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe, and the
United States.  The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a
naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade,
a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron.  The majority of these
British forces were engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra
region. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special
operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland had 200
special operations troops around Basra.  (For more detailed information, see CRS
Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces, by Linwood B. Carter; and CRS
Report RL31843, Iraq: International Attitudes to Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Reconstruction, by Steven A. Hildreth, Jeremy Sharp, Melanie Caesar, Adam Frost,
and Helene Machart.)
The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to
paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the
military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking
Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations
plan,  and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations.
CENTCOM air commanders stressed that significant efforts would be made to
minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure, and they
were mostly successful in this effort.
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With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative
control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit.
CENTCOM  pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when
possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance.  CENTCOM spokesmen
characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive.  Oilfields and port facilities
throughout Iraq were secured, as were all major  air bases in Iraq.  Though a few oil
wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been only sporadic environmental
sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the
1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over 6,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner,
and believes that many more simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary
forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from
urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage.  Nevertheless,
greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines,
and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in
the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra.
Though CENTCOM commanders expressed  confidence in the adequacy of
their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the
supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were
in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring
uninterrupted logistical support.  These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for
overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the
deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to
smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated
military planning.5 
Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry
out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq.  However, Special operations forces,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish
irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit.  Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the
north has been excellent.
Post-May 2003 Operations
With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services
(electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges
of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased.
Though U.S. forces have come under criticism for not having done more to provide
security, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly
when an important objective is winning popular support.  Harsh reactions risk
alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition
forces to maintain order.  Coalition forces also have had to try to keep Iraqi factional
violence from derailing stabilization efforts, with mixed success.  There is a
significant body of criticism that DOD’s leadership’s assumptions about the ease of
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the post-war transition led to inadequate planning within the department and the
disregard of extensive State Department planning efforts prior to the war.6
U.S. forces are spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, and many argue that
additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization
operations. DOD initially rejected this argument, stating that rather than adding more
U.S. troops, the increased number of Iraqi security forces could be counted on to
assist more extensively in stability operations.  Indeed, CENTCOM’s intent was to
reduce the U.S. contingent to 110,00 by the end of May 2004.  However, in April,
2004,  uprisings in central and southern Iraq led CENTCOM to alter its plan, and to
raise the number of U.S. troops to 141,000 by delaying the scheduled return of some
units and accelerating the deployment of others.  This number rose to almost 160,000
in early 2005 in anticipation of insurgents’ efforts to disrupt the January 2005 Iraqi
elections, and then has fluctuated from 138,000 to again 160,000 in place for the
December 2005 elections.  After these elections, DOD announced its intent to reduce
the U.S. troop level by 7,000-8,000 by not replacing units scheduled to rotate back
to home bases.  On December 23, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that
President Bush had approved the withdrawal of an undisclosed number of U.S. troops
in 2006.7 A reduction to a “baseline” of 138,000 by Spring 2006, and further
reductions in Summer 2006 have also been discussed.  Though some have speculated
that domestic concerns over the 2006 U.S. elections may encourage the Bush
Administration to speed withdrawals, DOD military and civilian officials remain
adamant that the security situation in Iraq and the adequacy of Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) will be the dominant factor in determining U.S. withdrawals.
Since the late Fall 2004, U.S. forces, with ISF participation, have undertaken
fairly constant counterinsurgency operations, focused primarily on strongholds in
central and western Iraq.  Though uniformly successful in defeating or driving out
insurgents, U.S. forces were insufficient to permanently garrison these areas to
prevent the insurgents return, thus requiring repeated assaults in some areas.
Beginning in late 2005, efforts were increased to establish Iraqi Security Force
garrisons in cleared areas.  The success of this approach will depend upon the
reliability of the ISF, and the ability of the Iraqi government at the national and local
levels to sustain them. 
The attitude of the Iraq population remains  the key element to stabilizing Iraq,
and depends upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of infrastructure
damage and economic dislocation, the demands of ethnic and religious groups, and
the speed with which a credible government can be established.  Though a short-term
post-war occupation was initially expected by some Administration officials, it is
now believed that a continued deployment of substantial military ground forces could
be necessary for several years, assuming that the new Iraqi government does not
request the removal of coalition forces.  For comparison, in the relatively benign
environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after nine years
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of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about 7,000
troops.  
 Iraqi Security Organizations
The Bush Administration has made the ability of the ISF to defeat the
insurgency and maintain order the pivotal element of continued U.S. military
presence in Iraq.  Though early ISF performance was poor, with many personnel
deserting and some actively joining the insurgents, Administration officials believe
that a strengthened training effort has provided more reliable units.  The Multi-
National Security Transition Command- Iraq   [http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/]
has responsibility for this training effort.  Participants include U.S., Australian, and
NATO trainers.8  Though initial efforts were hampered by delays in staffing U.S.
personnel, lack of equipment, and difficulties in retaining Iraqi personnel, training
efforts are now moving apace.  There are still, however, some concerns that Iraqi
security forces remain under-equipped, lacking sufficient vehicles, heavy weapons,
and communications equipment.9  There are also reports that the security forces have
been significantly infiltrated by insurgent informants.10 Independent estimates of the
time required to develop a full complement of fully capable security forces range up
to five years.11
Iraqi security forces total about 226,900  trained/equipped personnel, with an
estimated 272,000 required.  As of January 18, 2006, the State Department’s Iraq
Weekly Status Report [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2005/] provided
the following statistics.
Iraqi Security Forces (operational)
Police 82,100
Other Ministry of Interior Forces 38,000
Army 105,500
Air Force 500
Coastal Defense Force 800
Total 266,900
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Iraqi Resistance
Coalition troops, Iraqi security forces, and civilian support personnel continue
to come under frequent and deadly attacks, primarily in central Iraq, but sporadically
in southern and northern Iraq also.  This constant potential for attack affects the pace
and mode of reconstruction and stabilization operations.  Troops must assume a
potentially hostile environment, yet try to avoid incidents or actions that erode
popular support.  In addition to continuing attacks on coalition personnel, there have
been attacks on infrastructure targets (e.g., oil/gas pipelines, electrical power stations
and lines) hindering efforts to restore basic services to the civilian population.
Attacks on oil pipelines also threaten to further delay the use of Iraqi oil exports to
fund reconstruction programs.  Though it is virtually impossible to fully protect these
pipelines from sabotage, it is hoped that ongoing efforts to train specialized Iraqi
units will provide coalition troops some assistance in this mission. 
Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized
resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least
regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding.
CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “ a
classical guerrilla-type campaign.12 Though many attacks have been made with
improvised explosives, the resistance also has access to mortars, rocket launchers,
and surface-to-air missiles looted from Iraq army depots.  For example, one of the
President’s quarterly reports to Congress on Iraq operations noted that only 40% of
Iraq’s pre-war munitions inventory was secured or destroyed prior to April 2004.13
The resistance has also moved from solely guerrilla-style attacks to utilizing suicide
bombers.  DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime
supporters such Baathist party members, Republican Guard soldiers, and paramilitary
personnel.  However, others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition
forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier
regime, are contributing to the resistance.14  Estimates of the size of the insurgency
have ranged as high as 20,000. 15  There is, however, no reliable methodology for
determining actual numbers for an insurgency that operates for the most part
clandestinely.  It is generally assumed that the insurgency has a core of combatants,
with a significantly larger pool of active and passive supporters, predominantly
among the Sunni Muslim  population. Captured documents have given some
indication that preparations for a resistance movement were made prior to the war,
including the caching of arms and money.  
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Equipment Issues
Some equipment issues have attracted considerable public and congressional
attention: the availability of “up-armored” High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs or Humvees), armor for transport trucks, and the availability of the most
modern body armor for individual soldiers.  With most heavy armored vehicles being
withdrawn after major combat operations ceased, the HMMWVs are the primary
vehicles for patrols and transportation.  While they can fitted with a variety of
weapon systems for defense, the standard HMMWVs offer little protection against
the roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades favored by the Iraqi resistance.
This created an unanticipated demand for the “up-armored” version.  There were
relatively few of these in theater, and indeed relatively few (2%) in the Army
HMMWV inventory.  In response, the Army transferred available “up-armored”
vehicles from other theaters, and ordered ramped-up production from the vehicle’s
one manufacturer.  Funding for this effort has come from re-programming and from
DOD emergency supplemental appropriations.  In March 2005, the Army established
a requirement for 9,702 “up-armored” HMMWVs in Iraq (up from the May 2003
requirement of 235 vehicles) which was fulfilled as of September 2005.  In addition,
13,872 add-on armor kits have been added to conventional HMMWVs and other
vehicles in theater.  The Army is also moving to armor all its operational transport
vehicle.  This is being accomplished though both add-on armor kits and factory-built
truck cabs.  By spring 2005, CENTCOM maintained that all U.S. military vehicles
in Iraq  have some armor protection16 In the FY2005 emergency supplemental
appropriation  (P.L. 109-13), Congress added $150 million to the Army’s request for
up-armored HMMWVs, for a total of  $618 million for Army and Marine Corps
HMMWVs.  This supplemental appropriation also included $611 million for add-on
armor kits, $48 million more than DOD requested.  For FY2006, Congress
appropriated an additional $240 million for up-armored HMMWVs, and $150
million for add-on armor for light and medium transport vehicles.
The issue of modern body armor also arose in the period after major combat
operations ceased.  Initially, only dismounted, frontline combat troops were issued
the most modern body armor which can be upgraded with Small Arms Protective
Inserts, or so-called SAPI plates, which can stop most small-arms bullets and
shrapnel.  Combat support personnel, tank crews, and most National Guard and
Reserve troops were issued older Vietnam-era “flak jackets” with less protective
capability.  As it became clear that the security environment in Iraq made almost all
personnel vulnerable to attack, the demand for the SAPI plate armor increased
dramatically.  Press reports of soldiers’ families purchasing the armor to ship to Iraq,
and reports that National Guard units were being sent to Iraq with equipment inferior
to that of regular Army units exacerbated both public and congressional concern.
Again, the Army responded with orders for ramped-up production funded through
reprogramming ($310 million) from DOD’s Iraqi Freedom Fund and $40 million in
the FY2005 DOD appropriations request.  According to Army Chief of Staff
Schoomaker, as of November 2005 all personnel deployed to Iraq were equipped
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with up-to-date body armor.17  In January 2006, however, a report by a DOD medical
examiner was made public that noted that additional torso side armor could have
prevented a number of combat deaths.  In response to this report, both the Army and
Marine Corps have begun procurement of additional body armor.18
Force Level Debate
  The question of how many military personnel are required for stabilization
operations has been a subject of controversy since well before the onset of operations.
This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting how the political and
military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and how long a military presence will
be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government can be established. The
continued Iraqi armed resistance has reinvigorated the debate over whether the
United States has committed sufficient troops to the Iraqi operation.  There are
currently approximately 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq (For detailed coverage of U.S.
forces currently deployed, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces,
by Linwood B. Carter.)
The rapid success of the combat offensive initially quieted critics who argued
that a substantially larger ground force should have been deployed, but the question
is now being raised whether a more robust military presence in Iraq is needed to bring
stability.  Secretary Rumsfeld and out-going CENTCOM commander Gen. Franks
both maintained in congressional testimony that the number of troops in Iraq was
adequate for the mission, though the new insurgencies has changed this view. 
 DOD prepared a rotation plan for Army duty tours in Iraq, which called for
units to spend a one-year tour of duty in the region, however new operational
requirements prevented holding to this plan and some units will have spent more than
one year in Iraq by the time they return to home bases and can expect multiple
deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan.  The Army has examined the possibility of
instituting seven-month tours similar to the rotations maintained by the U.S. Marine
Corps, but the Army’s larger force presence in Iraq makes it unlikely that shorter
tours can be accomplished.19
Though senior DOD civilian and military officials have maintained that troop
levels have been adequate, and are determined by ground commanders’
recommendations, there has been continued controversy over whether there are
adequate forces to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign. The controversy
over additional troops in Iraq has rekindled the debate over whether the U.S. Army
personnel end-strength should be increased.  Currently, the congressionally mandated
end-strength is 502,400, with the Secretary of Defense having authorization to
increase this to 532,400 over the next three fiscal years. In reporting the FY2005
Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee noted the
“inadequacy of military manpower, especially active component end-strength, as
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indicated in the need to activate 33,000 reservists annually.”  The report further noted
that the Army had estimated its manpower shortfall to be between 41,000 to 123,000
personnel.  DOD’s civilian leadership is attempting to address these shortfalls in
specific functions by moving personnel from lower priority assignments and by
increasing the use of civilians in some functional areas to free up active duty military
personnel.  The Congress has approved a temporary increase of 30,000 to the Army’s
end-strength which is being funded through supplemental appropriations.  Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Schoomaker has voiced concern that adding to the Army’s
permanent end-strength would create financial burdens on the service that would
reduce the funds available for equipment modernization.20  (For additional
information, see CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate
Size for the United States Army?, by Edward F. Bruner.)
Non-U.S. Forces
A key element in the Defense Department’s consideration of troop requirements
in Iraq is the willingness of other nations to contribute ground forces.  DOD has
reported that about 23,000 non-U.S. troops from 27 other  nations are in Iraq, but has
not released a nation-by-nation breakdown of these contributions.  Press reports
indicate that Britain, Poland, South Korea, Italy, and the Ukraine are the largest
contributors.  Most nations, however, have deployed relatively small numbers of
troops, and questions remain about their operational capabilities.21  Some nations that
the United States has approached for assistance (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan, India) have
indicated that their participation would be dependent upon, at a minimum, a United
Nations resolution authorizing operations in Iraq.  However, after the United Nations
Security Council passed such a resolution, there still was no enthusiasm for
contributing military forces.  For these nations, significant domestic political
resistance to participation in Iraq operations remains a consideration.  Reflecting this,
2005 national elections in Spain resulted in a new government that withdrew the
Spanish contingent from Iraq immediately.  The contingents from Honduras and the
Dominican Republic, which were dependent upon Spanish forces for command and
logistic support, also withdrew. 
Though many NATO nations have unilaterally contributed troops, the Bush
Administration’s efforts to obtain an institutional NATO commitment to providing
combat troops have proven unsuccessful.  However, in January 2006, NATO
announced that all member nations are contributing to the training of Iraqi security
forces.  The nature of the contributions vary by nation from the purely monetary to
training missions on-site in Iraq. NATO officials have noted that the on-going
operations in Afghanistan, where it commands the International Security Assistance
Force, remain its primary focus.
Unlike stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, where contributing
nations assume the cost of their troop deployments, in Iraq the United States is
assuming much of the cost for non-U.S. force deployments.  The Administration has
CRS-11
not released a break-out of funding specifically for non-U.S. forces in Iraq.    The
following estimates non-U.S. troop contributions are from the CRS Report RL32105,
Post-War Iraq: A Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions, by Jeremy M.
Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard, and are based upon press reports and foreign
embassy statements.  An asterisk (*) indicates countries that are withdrawing or
reportedly considering withdrawing all or a portion of their forces from Iraq this year.
Table 1.  Countries Contributing Personnel to Iraq Operations





























22 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion,” Knight-Ridder Wire Service, Sept. 18, 2002;
“Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 26, 2003.
23 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, Mar. 25, 2002.
24 Edmund Andrews, “White House Weigh Price Tag on Emergency Request for Iraq,” New
York Times, Oct. 27, 2004.
Costs
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans in the 1990s, and it remains
a somewhat conjectural exercise.  Learning from the attempts to estimate costs for
military operations in the Balkans and elsewhere, DOD developed a computer model
based upon previous actual costs (Contingency Operations Support Tool).  Though
initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war
or conflict like that would cost,” in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50
billion.  Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-$85 billion cost, assuming a
six-month follow-on occupation.22  
On March 25, 2003, the Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003
supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of
Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003.  Specifically,
this request included funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with
military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations.  The
Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key
assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”23 Both the
House and Senate approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept.
108-76), which provided $62.37 billion. 
On September 17, 2003, President Bush submitted an $87 billion emergency
FY2004 supplemental budget request, of which $51.8 billion was for military
operations in Iraq (Operations and Maintenance- $32.3; Personnel $18.5).  On
October 30 2004, Congress approved an appropriation of $87.4 billion, a $400
million increase over the President’s request. Congress has also approved an FY2005
emergency “bridge”supplemental appropriation of $25 billion as a part of the
FY2004 DOD Appropriation Act.  In February 2005, the Administration submitted
a $74.9 FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriation request for operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and Congress responded by approving a supplemental appropriation
of $75.9 million (P.L. 109-13).  The FY2006 DOD Appropriations Act provided $50
billion as a “bridge” appropriation in anticipation of a FY2006 supplemental
appropriation request expected in early 2006.  DOD has estimated that the combined
military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are costing between $5-$6 billion
a month.24 (For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq,
Afghanistan and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco.)
Prior to the war, a number of cost estimates were put forward.  Michael
O’Hanlon  of the Brookings Institution pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between
$40-$50 billion, with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year.  Former
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25 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War,” New York Times,
Dec. 31, 2002, p. 1.
26 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for
Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003
27 Inside Defense.Com, Nov. 3, 2003. p. 1.
28  War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Dec. 2002, [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_
Iraq.pdf].
29 Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions, CRS Issue Brief
IB91019,  Sept. 1992. (Out of print. For copies, contact Steven Bowman 202-707-7613.)
30 The written reports were mandated by the Explanatory Statement of the Committee on
Conference on the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation (H.Rept. 109-72)
White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the
cost to be 1%-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion.  Mitch Daniels, Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, subsequently discounted this estimate as
“very, very high,” and stated that the costs would be between $50-$60 billion, though
no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.25 
In a March 2003 cost estimate, prior to the onset of the war, the Congressional
Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations
costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited
the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of
continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-$4 billion.26  On October 28, 2003,
CBO issued a letter report to Representative Spratt, ranking member of the House
Budget Committee, estimating the cost of four scenarios for the Iraq occupation.
Positing different troop levels, rates of withdrawal, and durations of the occupation,
the cost estimates ranged from $85 to $200 billion during the 2005-2013 time frame.
These estimates did not include funding for reconstruction or classified activities27
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences published a much more wide-
ranging report which covered the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition
to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs
could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.28  For comparison, the cost to the United
States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 was approximately $60 billion, and
almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.29
Other Congressional Action
Reflecting growing congressional concern over the conduct and duration of the
war in Iraq, the FY2006 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 109-63, Section 1222)
requires the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence
Agency,  to provide quarterly briefings to the Armed Services, Appropriations, and
Intelligence Committees of both chambers on the strategy for the war.  These
briefings are to be provided at the same time that the previously mandated written
reports on stability and security in Iraq are submitted.30
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The FY2006 DOD Authorization Act (Sec.1227) also established a detailed
quarterly report requirement on “U.S. Policy and Military Operations in Iraq.”  The
report is to be unclassified “to the maximum extent possible,” with a classified annex
if necessary.  Among the data to be provided in the report are the following items:
! Current military mission and the diplomatic, political, economic, and
military measures undertaken to achieve it, including:
Engaging the international community in stabilization efforts
Strengthening Iraqi government ministries
Training Iraqi Security Forces and transferring responsibility
! The number of Iraqi armed forces, police, and special unit battalions
that must be able to operate independently or “take the lead” in
counterinsurgency operations.
! The ability of Iraqi government ministries and local governments to
support and sustain security forces.
! A plan to achieve full Iraqi Security Force independent capability,
criteria to evaluate progress, and potentially disruptive variables.
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